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Why Aid Does Not Increase Savings
Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Since the mid-1980s, sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest
savings and investment rates of any region in the world. It has also
been the recipient of the highest levels of Official Development
Assistance relative to output. Hence, many analysts have been
concerned that ODA might be having a negative impact on
domestic savings.
This would be the case if ODA mostly encouraged higher
consumption rates, and did little to boost domestic investment.
Has this been the case? This Development Viewpoint investigates
this question (see Serieux, 2009).
Most previous analyses of this issue have presumed that aid could
be used for either domestic consumption or investment. However,
such analysis is incomplete since it also rests on the assumption
that all ODA actually stays within the developing country.
Analyses have also fixated on the derived econometric relationship
between ODA and domestic savings. This has been obtained
by regressing the savings/GDP ratio on ODA/GDP (and other
important explanatory variables, such as income per capita
and the dependency ratio).
A resultant estimate of -1 for the coefficient for the ODA variable was
presumed to indicate that ODA completely displaced domestic savings
(and was, therefore, wholly consumed), while a coefficient of 0 would
indicate that all aid was invested. Hence, an estimated coefficient
that was negative and close -1 would help explain why both
savings and investment rates remain so low in sub-Saharan Africa.
Displacing Savings
Most results have indicated that the coefficient ranges between -1
and 0 for the world as a whole and for most regions. But, curiously,
the coefficient for ODA lies closer to 0 for sub-Saharan Africa than
for other developing regions. This would appear to indicate that
there is less displacement of savings by ODA in sub-Saharan Africa,
and thus most aid is invested. But if this is true, why do domestic
savings and investment remain so low in sub-Saharan Africa?
What such analyses ignore is that a significant part of ODA might
be flowing back out of the country, without having had any impact
on either domestic consumption or investment. In other words, the
ODA-savings regressions have largely been misinterpreted. They
have ignored reverse flows altogether – the third option for an
outlet for ODA.
The reverse outflow of ODA could assume various forms. It could be
used to reduce foreign liabilities, namely, by paying interest on
foreign debt and principal payments on non-concessional debt. It
could take the form of net acquisition of foreign assets by the private
sector (capital flight) or by the public sector (reserve accumulation).
What does such a tripartite analysis (consumption, investment or
capital outflow) reveal for sub-Saharan Africa? What share of ODA
finances each of the three? To answer this question, we used panel
data on relevant regression variables for 29 sub-Saharan African
countries for the period 1965 to 2006. We regressed savings on total
ODA/GDP as well as its two major components, Grants/ODA and
Concessional Loans/GDP (together with other relevant variables).
Capital Outflows
We found that, at the margin, 35 per cent of ODA simply financed
capital outflow. And only 24 per cent financed domestic investment.
The remaining 41 per cent financed domestic consumption (see for
the year 1965-2006). Grants had a significant coefficient of about
-0.5 but loans were insignificant.
We then narrowed our period to 1974 to 1994, when ODA was almost
continuously increasing, to see whether the trend of increasing ODA
made a difference to those estimates. The percentage of ODA used to
finance capital outflows jumped to 48 per cent while the percentage
boosting domestic consumption dropped to 21 per cent. The record
of financing domestic investment looked moderately better since the
percentage rose to 31 per cent.
However, the overall results do not paint an encouraging picture. It is
true that during the period in which ODA continuously increased, the
share that financed domestic investment rose. However, this could
be explained by the rising share of concessional lending vis-a-vis
grants since the former had a positive impact on savings.
Most troubling was the rise in the share of capital outflows, namely,
from 35 per cent (for the whole period) to 48 per cent (during the
period of rising ODA).
The most likely outflows, especially during the late 1980s and early
1990s, were debt service payments. During the more recent period,
accumulating foreign-exchange reserves may have become more
important. But determining the composition of capital outflows is
a topic for more in-depth research.
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